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Introduction
Following the reforms of the public management system 
in the 1980s, legislative change and programmes of work 
to develop and shape the system have occurred at various 
times. The work programmes have tended to come and go, 
with mixed success, each designed around maintaining the 
strengths that accountability for outputs has brought to 
public sector agencies while increasing the focus on achieving 
outcomes. 
through the various periods of activity. 
The objective is to bring to the surface 
the continuity of thought and action that 
is the basis for a smooth and continuous 
pathway to enduring reform. 
The spirit of reform
In 2013 Parliament passed some significant 
changes to the State Sector, Public Finance 
and Crown Entities acts. The two major 
parties supported the state sector changes, 
and minor party objections did not run 
counter to the fundamental direction of 
change. All parties supported the public 
finance and Crown entities changes. The 
direction of change was to strengthen the 
accountability of state sector agencies to 
work better together on problems and 
opportunities that required collaborative 
effort, and to make it easier for them to 
do so. The cross-party support may have 
defined the common position without 
meeting the full appetite for change, but it 
was a good indication of the agreed broad 
direction of change.
The legislative changes were designed 
to support the government’s Better Public 
Services programme. That programme 
continues a reform pathway that has 
been developing through successive 
governments since the reforms of the 
1980s. The reform pathway has not been 
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The Better Public Services programme 
currently under way is the latest manifes-
tation. In essence, it is about the system 
reform required to get the public services 
to think and operate across the whole 
government system and beyond to 
effectively address complex issues that 
have been holding New Zealand back 
from continuing prosperity, and to create 
opportunities through collaborative 
endeavour. As with past efforts, it is about 
retaining the strengths of individual agency 
accountability within a system which 
encompasses collective responsibility. If 
the stop-go history of reform since the 
1980s is to be avoided, then the task for 
the public sector is to build continuity and 
momentum around the current reform and 
embed it into the whole-of-government 
system. This means a state services system 
that is widely recognised as supporting the 
government of the day, meeting agency 
accountabilities, and being an excellent 
steward of public resources for the benefit 
of present and future generations of New 
Zealanders. 
This article traces aspects of the 
state sector management system from 
the 1980s to the present day with a view 
to identifying the threads that weave 
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smooth, but underlying the fits and starts 
there is a broad direction of change that 
has clear and consistent objectives:
•	 to	create	a	state	sector	that	is	
increasingly responsive to the needs 
of New Zealanders in a fast-changing 
and technological world;
•	 to	deliver	the	support	and	services	
needed for the present and future 
well-being of New Zealanders and 
prosperity of New Zealand efficiently 
and effectively; and
•	 to	work	together	across	the	state	
sector and beyond to address 
difficult and complex issues and 
create the opportunities that arise 
from thinking and operating 
collaboratively. 
It is the last objective of the three that 
has proved particularly elusive, and the 
Better Public Services Advisory Group’s 
report of December 2011 focused on 
meeting that challenge in particular.
The present government and the state 
sector agencies have picked up the report’s 
recommendations through a number of 
projects and initiatives. These include the 
ten result areas; functional leads; heads 
of profession; shared services; sector 
group cross-cutting initiatives; a stronger 
focus on leadership development; and 
agency and chief executive performance 
monitoring and management. While 
these are all good in themselves and 
achieving worthwhile results, there is 
little evidence that they are transforming 
the way agencies think about their work 
and operate within a public services 
system as a matter of course. For the 
most part agencies have been able to 
comply without fundamentally changing 
the way they operate or giving significant 
benefit and recognition as contributors 
to a wider public services cause. 
The quick wins from simple forms of 
collaboration are important and relevant. 
But the real challenge lies at the ambitious 
end of the spectrum, where complex 
social, environmental and economic 
issues demand levels of collaboration that 
confront the institutional culture and 
arrangements of the last two-to-three 
decades. The issues are longstanding and 
symptomatic of a reform process that has 
yet to achieve its full objective. The Better 
Public Services Advisory Group described 
those issues as ‘thorny’. They include 
New Zealand’s relatively poor export 
performance, education failure, the health 
and safety of children, management and 
protection of our natural environment, 
generational welfare benefit dependency, 
social housing and other issues that no 
state sector agency working alone can 
successfully turn around.
The challenge we face is to retain 
the prevailing strengths of vertical 
accountability, and build on to it a greater 
sense of horizontal accountability. That is 
the system change required to tackle the 
thorny issues successfully and create the 
opportunities that arise from thinking 
and operating collaboratively. This is not 
a revelation.  
Clear action points have been 
designed to improve the system since the 
reforms of the 1980s. Legislative change 
to support the direction of reform has 
been developed consistently by successive 
governments. That is not quite the case 
with work programmes and projects for 
change, which have been started, stalled 
and reinvented in new forms by successive 
ministers, governments and public service 
leaders. The different approaches have 
caused the implementation of system 
improvement to be patchy. Even so, the 
direction of travel has been consistent.
This has been most evident in the 2000s, 
with the Report of the Advisory Group on 
the Review of the Centre (Advisory Group 
on the Review of the Centre, 2002) and 
the Better Public Services Advisory Group 
Report a decade later (Better Public Services 
Advisory Group, 2011) in many respects a 
mirror image of each other. That a decade 
separates two clearly compatible reports 
recommending similar change is evidence 
that little happened to shift the system. 
The key elements of the directional change 
in both reports are a state sector that:
•	 effectively	serves	the	government	of	
the day, supporting it to achieve its 
priorities;
•	 meets	the	developing	and	changing	
needs of citizens and prioritises the 
things that matter most to them and 
makes the most difference for New 
Zealand; and
•	 efficiently	and	effectively	executes	its	
stewardship role within each agency 
and across the system.
We have reached a point where the 
need for the state sector agencies to exercise 
individual stewardship accountabilities 
while taking responsibility as stewards 
across the whole system is urgent. What it 
will take is momentum around a reform 
programme which endures beyond 
changes of government and state sector 
leaders. 
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1984 ‘The decision-making processes themselves constrain the Government’s ability to act in the community’s collective 
interest.’
Economic Management, briefing to the 
incoming government 
1987 ‘Improved management outcomes will only be possible if the system is treated as a whole.’ 
Government Management, briefing to the 
incoming government 
1996 ‘The next steps in New Zealand states sector reform...will have to do for outcomes what has been accomplished for outputs.’
Allen Schick, The Spirit of Reform: managing the 
New Zealand state sector in a time of change
2001 ‘Weaknesses include the lack of a systemic approach to setting outcome goals and priorities.’
Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre
2011  ‘Getting better outcomes for New Zealanders – within appropriate and constitutional settings – is the highest calling for government 
 and the state services.’ 
Better Public Services Advisory Group Report 
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The problem of reform continuity 
in a democratic political system is well 
highlighted in a recent study carried out 
by the Institute for Government in the 
United Kingdom. The study reviews four 
distinct reforms between 1987 and 2012. 
In a foreword to the study, the director of 
the institute, Peter Riddell, states:
The authors make the key point 
about the dangers when senior 
officials and ministers move on, and 
their successors do not see the need 
to back a reform agenda associated 
with their predecessors. This applies 
not only to ministers of the same 
party but even more when there is 
a change of government and new 
ministers likely to be unfamiliar with 
Whitehall reforms. (Panchamia and 
Thomas, 2014, p.1)
The economic and management 
theories and principles underpinning the 
New Zealand reforms of the 1980s are 
well documented, and need no recounting 
for the purposes of this article. What 
those reforms confronted was a public 
service focused on what it took to run 
the public service, rather than what it 
took to efficiently and effectively benefit 
New Zealand and New Zealanders. While 
the success of those reforms is also well 
recognised, the main weakness to emerge 
is around the way agencies have developed 
into silos and become overly protective of 
their policy, information and operations. 
What gets lost in the fragmentation is 
the collective action required to deliver 
the common good. The incentives and 
accountabilities push agencies towards 
protecting their resources and capability 
from being diverted into endeavours that 
compromise their ability to show up well. 
Over time, an organisational culture is 
built which makes it very difficult to deal 
with complex issues that need collective 
action to resolve.
In essence, this is the failure of the 
almost singular focus on outputs that 
was entrenched through the legislation 
supporting the 1980s reforms. While the 
focus on outputs did create managerial 
accountability, it came at the price of too 
little attention being paid to the outcomes 
they were designed to achieve.
The focus on outputs was not an 
oversight. Typically, outcomes sit across 
a spectrum and require connected-up 
activity across a broad system to achieve. 
They were seen as the business of 
ministers. The combination of ministers 
being held accountable for their portfolio 
responsibilities and agencies similarly 
working to their siloed accountabilities 
meant that many issues requiring cross-
cutting collective action were inadequately 
addressed.
The impact of putting outcomes in 
the too-hard basket was a matter of much 
discussion through the 1990s; in 1995 the 
State Services Commission and Treasury 
commissioned Allen Schick, a professor 
of public policy at the University of 
Maryland, to review where the reform 
process was up to and recommend the 
way ahead. In setting the context, Schick 
reported: 
The organisational cocoon of the old 
State sector has been broken open 
and structures reshaped through the 
application of the reforms’ overriding 
principles. The State sector is 
more efficient, productive and 
responsive, and there generally has 
been significant improvement in the 
quality of services provided to New 
Zealanders. However, as with any 
leading technology, it may now be 
time to ‘debug’ elements which have 
not worked as well as anticipated. 
(Schick, 1996, executive summary) 
Maintaining momentum around 
reform is a challenge. Inevitably the 
new becomes the old, shortcomings 
and unintended consequences emerge, 
and, unless refreshed, the reform agenda 
withers on the vine. Reframing is 
therefore important to the long game of 
transformational change. As Schick states, 
‘When it comes to culture, staying power 
is the all-important indicator. Only after a 
lapse of years can one ascertain whether the 
reforms have become the new operating 
culture or merely the passing fashion of 
public management’ (ibid., p.51).
One of the issues Schick identified 
as requiring reframing was the issue of 
accountability. He complimented New 
Zealand on building accountability into 
the framework of government to an extent 
that no other country had accomplished, 
but he drew a distinction between 
accountability and responsibility:
The words lead down very different 
managerial paths. Responsibility 
is a personal quality that comes 
from one’s professional ethic, a 
commitment to do one’s best, a sense 
of public service. Accountability is an 
impersonal quality, dependent more 
on contractual duties and informal 
flows. Ideally, a manager should act 
responsibly, even when accountability 
does not come into play. As much 
as one might wish for an amalgam 
of the two worlds, the relentless 
pursuit of accountability can exact 
a price in the shrinkage of a sense 
of responsibility ... In the new world 
of New Zealand management, it is 
urgent to uphold the old-fashioned 
tenets of managerial responsibility, 
while strengthening the modern 
instruments of managerial 
accountability. (ibid., pp.84-5) 
This is at the heart of the balance 
the current system reform process needs 
to achieve: that chief executives are 
accountable for the stewardship of the 
people, assets and resources entrusted 
to their agency’s care, but they also have 
a responsibility for stewardship of the 
whole public services system.
This is a difficult balance that has 
significant leadership impacts. The chief 
executive must be able to judge when 
the agency needs to contribute to a 
collaborative exercise, and be prepared 
to reprioritise agency work to free up the 
resources so it can do so. In effect, they 
need to ‘take one for the team’ when the 
benefits from collaborative activity come 
at some cost to their agency activity. The 
system needs to acknowledge and reward 
that approach. Likewise, ministers need 
to sanction the collaborative approach 
and work within it. Shifting the system 
in that direction is a challenge to the 
cautious, risk-averse and compliant 
culture that a singular focus on output 
accountability encourages. That is a 
culture that restrains the passion and 
commitment of state servants to make 
a difference. That, in turn, constrains 
the innovative, experimental approaches 
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required to work on the important issues 
that require the public services to work 
across the system.
During the 1990s the government’s 
approach to the reform process was to 
introduce strategic result areas (SRAs). 
SRAs were designed to link the govern-
ment’s long-term objectives with the 
department’s operational activities. The 
approach continued to locate account-
ability for outcomes with ministers, 
while agencies worked to key result areas 
(KRAs), which in effect meant outputs. 
The approach had little impact in terms 
of system change. At the ministerial lev-
el, a change in prime minister brought 
the creation of ministerial teams around 
particular projects, such as Strengthening 
Families, which required departments to 
work formally together. But that approach 
went out with a change in government in 
1999.
The new government commissioned 
an advisory group to review the central 
agencies, which in reality meant a review 
of how well the public management 
system was responding to the needs and 
expectations of ministers and citizens. 
The advisory group’s report – the Report 
of the Advisory Group on the Review of 
the Centre (2002) – focused on three core 
areas for change:
•	 achieving	better	integrated,	citizen-
focused service delivery;
•	 fragmentation	and	new	ways	to	get	
agency collaboration on key cross-
cutting issues; and
•	 improving	leadership	and	building	
workforce capability around a 
unifying sense of values.
The government responded with 
regional ‘circuit breaker’ teams focused 
on specific issues,1 Crown entity 
governance proposals, an executive 
leadership programme to strengthen 
senior management, and a programme of 
innovation.2
Cabinet signed off on the State 
Services Commission’s Managing for 
Outcomes programme in August 2002, 
effectively endorsing an approach that 
had been designed earlier. The approach 
became bogged down in the complexity 
of linking outputs directly to outcomes. It 
revealed the weakness of fragmentation, 
because typically the outcomes to which 
an agency’s outputs contributed could 
only be achieved by multiple agencies 
working together, and that wider front was 
not organised and operating. Some cross-
cutting initiatives did emerge, including 
social sector and economic development 
theme teams, the justice pipeline and the 
natural resource sector group. The State 
Services Commission designed a set of 
development goals around a trusted state 
sector that attracted and developed top 
talent and made it easy and effective for 
New Zealanders to access services and 
work with government. But the goals 
did not seem to fit into any integrated 
initiative to determine what that meant 
at the system level and implement it. 
Change over this period tended to be ad 
hoc rather than enduring and systematic. 
This was in large part because the 
relationship between the central agencies 
was too weak to provide the collective 
leadership required, which combined with 
waning ministerial interest. 
Ministers reignited their interest 
in 2006 and adopted a suggestion by 
the three central agencies to carry out 
another Review of the Centre, which 
in effect was a performance review of 
the public services system. That led to 
the establishment of the Performance 
Improvement Framework (PIF), which 
began as a score-sheet of performance 
but has evolved into distilling agencies’ 
four-year strategic outlook and an 
assessment of their current capability to 
achieve it. (PIF is now evolving into being 
the lynchpin of a process to set the four-
year strategic horizon and create a plan 
to show how that will be accomplished 
within budget, and performance measures 
for the chief executive out of that.) While 
many positive aspects endured in the 
wake of this review, they fell well short of 
transformational system reform. But they 
did provide a platform for change.
The change of government in 2008 
coincided with challenges on three fronts 
which shifted the context: the global 
financial crisis; disaster management; 
and heightened frustration around the 
continued failure of the state sector to 
effectively address major issues that were 
holding New Zealand back. The global 
financial crisis forced the efficiency 
agenda to new heights. The government 
cut agency budgets and demanded 
that they do ‘more for less’. This forced 
agencies to work out how they could 
deliver their outputs with fewer resources. 
They received some support, with greater 
flexibility to plan and budget on a four-
year cycle and to move resources between 
outputs. 
The disaster management came 
about as a result of the Canterbury 
earthquakes, the Pike River Mine disaster 
and the grounding of the ship Rena on 
the Astrolab Reef. All three not only 
challenged the state sector to collaborate 
and coordinate, but showed that at such 
times it was willing and able to do so. 
That begged the question: why is it so 
difficult in ordinary times? 
Part of the answer to that is, it 
isn’t necessarily. There are numerous 
examples of agency cooperation. Regional 
operational agencies, in particular, are 
typically no strangers to working together 
and with their wider communities. But 
it is difficult where organisations have 
to think and operate across the system 
when the benefits fall unevenly and 
at the expense of their priorities and 
resources. That brings into stark relief the 
tension between an agency’s stewardship 
accountability and its responsibility to 
support stewardship of the government 
system as a whole.
The third front was the heightened 
level of frustration from ministers that 
Cabinet signed off on the State Services 
Commission’s Managing for Outcomes programme 
in August 2002, effectively endorsing an approach 
that had been designed earlier.
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public spending had risen significantly 
in the 2000s but with little return for it. 
The problems that were holding New 
Zealand back and required collaboration 
across the system were not being solved, 
and in some cases getting worse. The 
government introduced a number of 
changes, including social sector trials 
which aimed to address specific issues 
at the regional and community level, 
functional leadership initiatives, a 
requirement for agencies to produce four-
year strategic financial and capability 
plans, and formalised sector groups with 
designated programmes of cooperative 
work. It sought new ways to broaden 
policy advice through sector groups, 
the establishment of a Productivity 
Commission to take a broad look at 
pressing issues, one-off taskforces in tax 
and welfare reform, contracting social 
advice through the Families Commission, 
and new consultation processes through 
the Land and Water Forum
The three central agencies formed 
a Corporate Centre (later clarified to 
include the functional leads, and the 
government chief information officer 
in particular) to lead measure and 
monitor system change. Legislative 
change strengthened the powers of the 
state services commissioner, particularly 
around leadership for system change.
The main focus for public sector 
reform came with the appointment 
in May 2011 of the ministerial Better 
Public Services Advisory Group to report 
on ways to shift the system. Its report 
clarified the two key objectives for change. 
The first is getting better outcomes for 
New Zealanders. This means mobilising 
across the public service to tackle the 
complex and ‘thorniest’ issues (it cited 
a list of lingering social, environmental 
and economic issues). The second key 
objective is to improve the quality, 
responsiveness and value-for-money of 
state services. 
The Better Public Services report was 
in many respects a mirror image of the 
Review of the Centre a decade earlier, 
and it spawned a wealth of activity which 
had its nucleus in ten government result 
areas. The urgency and pragmatism 
around all this activity saw the language 
of outcomes replaced by results. Results in 
this context are effectively bite-sized pieces 
of an outcome (similarly to what were 
previously called intermediate outcomes). 
And the government talked about wanting 
to see tangible progress towards its larger 
objectives, which in effect was a renaming 
of outcome indicators. 
The open question is whether the 
sum total of activity from the Better 
Public Services programme is doing more 
than extracting compliance that can be 
delivered without agencies changing their 
operating model. A review of activity 
across the system which reported in 
February this year suggests that agencies 
are increasingly attuned to the problem-
solving and opportunities created from 
collaborative endeavour, but that we are 
some distance yet from the system as a 
whole operating that way as a matter of 
course. The ambition extends well beyond 
that to a point where agencies continue 
to deliver their lead accountabilities, but 
think and operate innovatively across the 
system, taking collective responsibility 
for common goods. That involves 
transformational change of the current 
whole-of-government system and a 
significant shift in the current culture. 
Overview
It is possible to see a consistent direction of 
reform in government management from 
the 1980s to the present day, particularly 
so with the progressive evolution of 
legislative change to support system 
change. No government has turned the 
clock back in any significant way in that 
respect. 
Programmes of change are another 
matter. They have been periodic, slow 
and repetitive. Even so, underpinning the 
repetition of thinking and activity and 
rebranding that has taken place in fits 
and starts there is a consistent ambition 
to achieve the outcomes that will make 
the most difference to the lives of New 
Zealanders. Those social, environmental 
and economic outcomes have not 
changed greatly over time, although 
some issues have become worse and the 
urgency to address them has become 
greater. The only area of reform where 
policy has lurched is over the ownership 
of the state’s commercial assets. That is 
a defining political issue which sits on 
the edges of public management reform. 
In respect to state services, there is a 
consistent desire to retain the strengths 
of agency accountability for outputs 
while attempting to get a better balance 
between that and achieving outcomes.
Given over a quarter of a century 
of reform effort, why have the public 
services been prepared to live with the 
glaring results of failure for so long?
The roles and responsibilities of the 
central agencies, and the State Services 
Commission in particular, were signifi-
cantly reduced by the decentralisation of 
accountabilities to individual agencies. 
This led to a sense of a weakened com-
mission that has taken a long time to 
redefine itself. Consequently, subsequent 
reform after the 1980s was typically led 
by ministers, in bursts of activity followed 
by periods of inertia, each with little ref-
erence to the previous activity. Agencies 
responded to what was required, without 
embracing the spirit of ongoing reform 
that would have required them to redress 
the high degree of autonomy they enjoyed 
and deliver resources across the system at 
some cost to their own agency’s priori-
ties. In short, the state sector did not take 
ownership of reform and design, nor lead 
an integrated programme of change to 
improve the system.
But there is reason to be optimistic. 
While ministers generated the Better 
Public Services programme, the report 
that crystallised the direction of reform 
was led by the public sector, working with 
private sector advisers and engaging with 
For the first time since the 80s, reform had the 
involvement and backing of ministers and the 
public sector working in tandem.
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the public sector chief executives. For the 
first time since the 80s, reform had the 
involvement and backing of ministers and 
the public sector working in tandem.
The state services commissioner, Iain 
Rennie, has stated that ‘this system wide 
change is the business of the commission, 
and the only business of the commission’ 
(State Services Commission, 2014, p.4), 
and he has reorganised the way the 
commission and the governance of system 
reform operates to align with that and 
allow him to focus on leading that system 
change. This means that state services 
working co-operatively in the collective 
interests of New Zealanders is the lens 
for all the commission’s work. ‘The State 
Sector has the mandate from Government 
and the opportunity to fundamentally 
reshape how we work and deliver services. 
We are in the throes of the most significant 
changes the State Sector has seen for 25 
years.’ Achieving that level of reform is, 
says Rennie, ‘the most significant changes 
the State Sector has seen for 25 years, and 
will result in a fundamental reshaping of 
how the State Sector works and delivers 
services’ (ibid., p.2).
Public service chief executives 
affirmed their commitment to that 
reform at a meeting in March 2014 at 
Brackenridge retreat, Martinborough, 
where they crafted and signed their own 
Brackenridge Declaration.
Conclusion
There has been a consistent direction 
of travel for state sector reform across 
governments since the 1980s. The 
2000s has seen a sharp focus on how 
a fragmented system makes it difficult 
to get traction on the big, intractable 
cross-cutting issues that require multiple 
agency collaboration. These are the issues 
that, if unchecked, will continue to hold 
back social, environmental and economic 
progress for New Zealanders. Reforming 
the public services system to operate 
this way will not only address historic 
problems, but create opportunities.
The key to getting momentum around 
such reform is for the public service to 
create and own a system that is better fitted 
to delivering the results that governments 
of the day are committed to delivering. It 
must also identify and get traction on the 
long-term issues and opportunities that 
matter most to New Zealanders and will 
make the most difference to present and 
future generations. To endure, that has to 
attract broad support across the political 
system, so that it is not associated with 
a particular regime but is rather seen as 
the way the public services need to think 
and operate.
The State Services Commission is 
currently coordinating the preparation 
of a public services brief to the incoming 
government in an effort to build that 
support. It will set out reform progress to 
date, and identify where effort and change 
is needed to take the public services from 
good to great. It will not, and should not, 
surprise in that process. We have known 
the problems for years, and the levers for 
change. What we need to do is entrench 
the common understandings of the 
problem, and the commitment and effort 
that is now evident to tackle it. That is 
what is required to demonstrate value for 
money from the political–public service 
system.
1 There were three teams established, tasked with reducing 
the truancy rate, more rapid settlement of skilled migrants, 
and reducing the fragmentation of funding to community 
groups dealing with domestic violence.
2 The only example cited subsequently was the Department of 
Conservation’s pest eradication programme which moved the 
mindset from controlling pests to eradicating them.
THE BRACKENRIDGE DECLARATION 
WE are the leadership team of the State Services:
Our purpose is:
Collective leadership for a better New Zealand
Towards this we will: 
•	 Be	collectively	ambitious	for	New	Zealand,	by	focusing	on	the	needs	of	
our customers 
•	 Mobilise	our	people	and	resources	to	ensure	those	leading	complex	
system-wide issues are successful
•	 See	past	any	barriers	and	make	what	needs	to	happen,	happen
•	 Champion	state	sector	reform	in	our	organisations
•	 Support	each	other	as	a	team	‘out	together,	back	together’,	pick	up	the	
phone
•	 Collectively	and	individually	support	and	implement	the	work	of	
functional leaders
•	 Own	and	champion	decisions	of	the	State	Sector	Reform	Leadership	
Group
•	 Prioritise	our	biannual	State	Services	Leadership	team	meetings
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